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Average rating: 5.0 of 5
What are properties? 5 out of 5 stars.
16 of 17 people found this review helpful.
The essays in this topical collection provide a thorough discussion of that question. Drawn mostly from contemporary philosophy, the collection nevertheless begins a bit further back: with Gottlob Frege's "Function and Concept," two contributions from Bertrand Russell, and F.P. Ramsey's "Universals."More recent selections are included from W.V.O. Quine ("On What There Is"), Frank Jackson, Michael Devitt, D.M. Armstrong, Donald C. Williams, Keith Campbell, Chris Daly, David Lewis, Sydney Shoemaker, and co-editor D.H. Mellor.
The volume will be of special interest to readers looking for sources on the problem of universals. Naturally each contribution deals with the problem to some extent, but particularly interesting is an exchange between Michael Devitt and D.M. Armstrong. Nominalists and realists sometimes talk past each other about this problem, and sure enough, much of the exchange between Devitt and Armstrong has to do with (a) why nominalists don't think there really _is_ a "problem" of universals and (b) why realists think nominalists are being all but willfully blind.
In a spirited but cheerfully sporting verbal tennis match, Devitt responds to Armstrong's complaints (in _Universals and Scientific Realism_) about "ostrich nominalism" by attacking "mirage realism" instead. Armstrong offers a rejoinder which he thinks improves on his earlier discussion. The two part friends, with no injuries.
There is also good discussion on trope theory and "abstract particulares," as one might expect from the inclusion of essays by Williams, Campbell, and Daly. This is an excellent collection both overall and in detail.
It will be of interest to readers of D.M. Armstrong's _Universals: An Opinionated Introduction_, and it will also fit well alongside Andrew Schoedinger's topical collection _The Problem of Universals_. (There is surprisingly little overlap between Schoedinger's volume and the present one. Ramsey's "Universals," Russell's "The World of Universals," and Quine's "On What There Is" are the only essays common to the two collections.)
Editorial Review:
When we say a certain rose is red, we seem to be attributing a property, redness, to it. But are there really such properties? If so, what are they like, how do we know about them, and how are they related to the objects which have them and the linguistic devices which we use to talk about them? This collection presents these ancient problems in a modern light. In particular, it makes accessible for the first time the most important contributions to the contemporary controversy about the nature of properties. Those new to the subject will find the clearly-written introduction, by two experts in the field, an invaluable guide to the intricacies of this debate. The volume illustrates very well the aims and methods of modern metaphysics and show how a thorough understanding of the metaphysics of properties is crucial to most of analytic philosophy.